



# **MARKSCHEME**

**November 2010**

**HISTORY**

**Route 2**

**Higher Level**

**Paper 3 – Aspects of the history  
of Africa**

27 pages

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*Paper 3 markbands: The following bands provide a précis of the full markbands for paper 3 published in the History guide (2008) on pages 77–81. They are intended to assist marking, but must be used in conjunction with the full markbands found in the guide. **For the attention of all examiners: if you are uncertain about the content/accuracy of a candidate’s work please contact your team leader.***

<b>0:</b>	Answers not meeting the requirements of descriptors should be awarded no marks.
<b>1–2:</b>	Answers do not meet the demands of the question and show little or no evidence of appropriate structure. There is little more than unsupported generalization.
<b>3–4:</b>	There is little understanding of the question. Historical knowledge is present but the detail is insufficient. Historical context or processes are barely understood and there are little more than poorly substantiated assertions.
<b>5–6:</b>	Answers indicate some understanding of the question, but historical knowledge is limited in quality and quantity. Understanding of historical processes may be present but underdeveloped. The question is only partially addressed.
<b>7–8:</b>	The demands of the question are generally understood. Relevant, in-depth, historical knowledge is present but is unevenly applied. Knowledge is narrative or descriptive in nature. There may be limited argument that requires further substantiation. Critical commentary may be present. An attempt to place events in historical context and show an understanding of historical processes. An attempt at a structured approach, either chronological or thematic has been made.
<b>9–11:</b>	Answers indicate that the question is understood, but not all implications are considered. Knowledge is largely accurate. Critical commentary may be present. Events are generally placed in context, and historical processes, such as comparison and contrast, are understood. There is a clear attempt at a structured approach. Focus on AO1, AO2 and AO4. Responses that simply summarize the views of historians cannot reach the top of this markband.
<b>12–14:</b>	Answers are clearly focused on the demands of the question. Relevant in-depth knowledge is applied as evidence, and analysis or critical commentary is used to indicate some in-depth understanding, but is not consistent throughout. Events are placed in context and there is sound understanding of historical processes and comparison and contrast. Evaluation of different approaches may be used to substantiate arguments presented. Synthesis is present, but not always consistently integrated. Focus on AO3 and AO4.
<b>15–17:</b>	Answers are clearly structured and focused, have full awareness of the demands of the question, and if appropriate may challenge it. Accurate and detailed historical knowledge is used convincingly to support critical commentary. Historical processes such as comparison and contrast, placing events in context and evaluating different interpretations are used appropriately and effectively. Answers are well-structured and balanced and synthesis is well-developed and supported with knowledge and critical commentary.
<b>18–20:</b>	Answers are clearly focused with a high degree of the awareness of the question and may challenge it successfully. Knowledge is extensive, accurately applied and there may be a high level of conceptual ability. Evaluation of different approaches may be present as may be understanding of historical processes as well as comparison and contrast where relevant. Evaluation is integrated into the answer. The answer is well-structured and well-focused. Synthesis is highly developed.

**1. Compare and contrast the contributions of Mzilikazi and Lobengula to the rise of the Ndebele.**

The Ndebele state was founded by Mzilikazi, who succeeded his father in 1818 as ruler of the Khumalo chiefdom under Zwide. With the defeat of Zwide by Shaka, the Zulu leader Mzilikazi transferred his allegiance to him. He eventually quarrelled with Shaka and fled north with his people. He established a powerful state incorporating many Sotho communities. Threatened by powerful enemies he moved his capital several times and eventually settled in western Zimbabwe. His state survived and expanded through geographical mobility and military might. His success resulted from his effective political and military organization, adopted from the Zulu state. He used diplomacy when he could to achieve peace with his external enemies and tried to foster a sense of common identity between conquered peoples and his ruling elite. He had opened up his state to European missionaries and traders before his death in 1868.

Lobengula also used diplomacy and force where necessary to try and save his kingdom from being violently overrun by white people. He faced a more serious external threat than Mzilikazi had. The Ndebele state was threatened under Lobengula by the ambitions of the European imperialists and concession seekers. He offered mining concessions which broke Ndebele traditions but did not at first endanger sovereignty or provoke anti-foreign reaction among the Ndebele. The policy worked in 1870 but failed drastically later when he was deceived into granting the Rudd Concession in 1888 and thus lost all control over white penetration of his country. He failed for two reasons. First, he was not an absolute ruler who could dictate policies to his people and see it carried out without opposition. Second, he was outwitted by Rhodes and his agents. He soon repudiated the concession but Rhodes was determined to exploit it. Jameson's invasion of Matabeleland in 1893 incited Lobengula to armed resistance. The Ndebele were defeated but Lobengula was not captured before his death in 1894. Mzilikazi achieved more than Lobengula but he did not have to face the brutal determination and military might of Rhodes and his pioneer column.

*If only Mzilikazi or Lobengula is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [7 marks].*

**2. Analyse the factors which led to the rise and fall of the Mahdist state in Sudan between 1881 and 1898.**

The Mahdist state established in 1885 was the result of a jihad led by Muhammad ibn Abdullah with the objective of restoring a purified Islam to Sudan. The core of Mahdist support came from the West Nile especially the Baqqara Arab-speaking cattle-owning people of Kordofan and the Nuba Mountains who resented the Egyptian government's attempts to tax and control them more than the settled agriculturalists of the Nile valley did. Though the Mahdi was inspired by piety, many supporters were mainly interested in ridding the country of the alien Turco-Egyptian administration imposed on them since 1821, and the popularity and success of the Mahdi's revolt was the result of resentment of Turco-Egyptian rule, its heavy taxation levied by force and of its attempts to suppress the slave trade, which was the basis of the domestic and agrarian economy in northern Sudan.

The rise of the Mahdist state could not have occurred, let alone succeeded, without the personality and leadership of the Mahdi. But its success was certainly helped by changing political conditions in Egypt after the deposition of Ismail, the defeat of Urabi and the occupation of Egypt by Britain, which was not then prepared to spend money on controlling Sudan. The Mahdi could move quickly to take full control. Khartoum fell and Charles Gordon, sent by the British to evacuate it, was killed.

The Mahdist state did not collapse because of any incompetence on the part of its ruler. Abdullah had prevented northern Sudan from relapsing into anarchy after the Mahdi's death. His strength of personality and administrative talent was such that he established his control so firmly that it was broken ultimately only by a foreign invader with superior military resources anxious to control a vital strategic area. After an unsuccessful Mahdist attempt to invade Egypt in 1889, Britain did not follow up her victory because the Mahdists no longer seemed a threat. The whole diplomatic and military situation in the upper Nile valley changed in 1896. After Menelik's victory at Adowa, Anglo-Egyptian forces moved into Dongola, not to reconquer Sudan for Egypt, but to help Italy by distracting the Mahdists from trying to win back Kassala, captured by the Italians in 1894. Kitchener's forces soon captured the province of Dongola. In 1897 Marchand came from Brazzaville to Fashoda in southern Sudan. Britain then embarked on the full reconquest of Sudan to forestall French and Ethiopian ambitions in the region. The Mahdist army, mostly armed with antiquated muskets or spears, could not hope to hold out against the British gunboats, howitzers cannon, maxim guns and the latest repeater rifles. The battle of Omdurman in 1898 marked the end of the Mahdist state though Abdullah was not killed till 1899. The Mahdist state had fallen because of Sudan's strategic significance and Britain's motive was to keep rival powers out of the upper Nile valley.

### 3. Analyse the causes of the Mfecane and its impact on Southern Africa.

The Mfecane was a time of upheaval in southern Africa which started off in the first decades of the nineteenth century. There has been much debate about the causes with some historians in the 1980s questioning whether it really happened. It originated in the south-eastern lowveld among the emerging northern Nguni kingdoms of the Mthethwa, Ndwandwe and Ngwane. It stemmed from increased competition for the region's limited resources. High average rainfall and the adoption of maize may have contributed to population growth. In the early nineteenth century population pressure and land shortage aggravated by drought and famine in 1800–1803, 1812 and 1816–1818 led to a struggle for supremacy in the region. The development of long distance trade with the Tsonga and Portuguese at Delagoa Bay encouraged the growth of northern Nguni states. The desire to control the export of ivory heightened competition for the rich hunting grounds of the coastal forest belt. The Nguni of the lowveld held initiation ceremonies and formed age-regiments, a practice perhaps adopted from the Sotho-Tswana. As chiefdoms grew in size and competition between them for limited resources became more marked, the role of the armed regiments grew ever more significant. They helped to expand the chiefdoms' range of grazing, cultivating and hunting land, and to defend their holdings from the raids of rivals. In the period of famine crisis, regiments were almost permanently in the field, defending territory and raiding neighbours. Weak chiefdoms sought the protection of more powerful neighbours and were incorporated into the major kingdoms voluntarily or by force.

The Mfecane triggered off a chain of events which led to the eclipse of existing states like the Mthethwa, Ndwandwe, Ngwane and the Hlubi and the rise of new states. It saw the emergence of aggressive conquest states like the Zulu, Ndebele and Gaza kingdoms, and of defensive kingdoms like Lesotho, Swaziland and Kololo. Within these states it brought out the ingenuity of African political leaders and forced them to improve their military tactics and political skills.

The Mfecane led to the temporary depopulation of parts of Southern Africa, which facilitated the taking over of these areas by the Boers during the Great Trek. The Boers thus expanded into the interior of Southern Africa and established themselves in the Transvaal area and the basin of the Orange River at the expense of the Sotho nation.

*If only the causes or impact are discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].*

**4. Why had the Asante become one of the leading powers in West Africa by 1850?**

The Asante Empire which was founded in the eighteenth century with its nucleus around Kumasi evolved a highly integrated political system whose political and spiritual unity was symbolized by the institution of the Golden Stool. At the centre of the empire were the groups associated with the Oyoko clan of Kumasi who evolved a centralized monarchical system. Neighbouring Akan kingdoms as well as northern kingdoms, such as Geriya and Dagomba, were incorporated into the empire. As Asantehene the king of Kumasi exercised authority over the whole empire.

The empire came to wield tremendous economic and political power over the dependent kingdoms of the north and the autonomous Fante chiefdoms and other states on the coast. At the heart of the empire the central Asante chiefdoms were united under the authority of the Asantehene by the same language and culture, a network of kinship ties, a century of common military activities and pride in their achievements.

The calibre of the rulers was a factor in the rise of the empire. It achieved the peak of its power in the reign of Osei Bonsu (1801–1824). He led a vigorous push to the coast to consolidate control of the economy against the resistance of the coastal regions. He reorganized the administration, appointing representatives in the provinces to keep them in control. He appointed civil servants on the basis of ability, and not of family connections, and employed Muslims to keep records in Arabic.

Candidates may point out that despite its rise, there were inherent weaknesses (before 1850) and external factors threatening the empire. Despite the work of Osei Bonsu, the system of provincial administration never became fully effective. The vassal states were never fully incorporated into the empire. Their desire to regain control over their own affairs remained as strong as ever. Their continued allegiance to the Asantehene depended on the military strength of metropolitan Asante. That strength came to be destroyed by a series of defeats inflicted on the Asante from 1826.

**5. Why was the Berlin West Africa Conference called in 1884, and what were the consequences for Africa before 1900?**

By 1884 there was increased European interest in Africa which was threatening to become out of control and to end in a European war. The old concept of informal empire was no longer tenable as trade rivalry intensified. Leopold's activities in the Congo had stimulated interest among and action by other powers. De Brazza's treaty with Makoko was ratified by the French parliament after Britain's occupation of Egypt in 1882. Leopold declared a Congo Free State but Portugal had claims in the area, which Britain supported. Portugal suggested an international conference to settle the question of the lower Congo. The idea was taken up by Bismarck who as part of his new foreign policy in Europe wanted a better opportunity to show that Germany was friendly towards France.

The Berlin West Africa Conference met at the end of 1884. It was not the initial intention of the conference to attempt a general partition of Africa. The result of the conference was, however, to give impetus to the partition. The resolutions by the conference laid down ground rules for further scrambling for Africa. It established "spheres of influence". Powers had to prove "effective occupation" and inform their rivals before annexing a territory. This was a powerful stimulus to actual European invasion on the ground in order to make good the claim of spheres of influence. The process of African "treaty-making" developed at an even faster pace. In a rapid sequence states were conquered and boundary negotiations effected. Germany declared protectorates in Togo, Cameroon, Tanganyika and South-west Africa, all in areas adjacent to British colonies or spheres of influence. Britain's reaction was to form more colonies – the Niger Coast Protectorate in 1894, the East African Protectorate in 1895, Sierra Leone in 1896, Sudan in 1898 and Northern Nigeria in 1900. The French rapidly began expanding in West and Equatorial Africa. By 1900 most of Africa was brought under European colonial rule. In the short-term, the conference also internationalized the Congo basin and split the Niger basin between Britain and France.



**6. “The partition of Africa was caused more by African political and military weakness than by European rivalry.” To what extent do you agree with this statement?**

This quotation can be strongly challenged, and better candidates are likely to argue that African political and military weakness facilitated rather than caused the partition of Africa. The Ethiopian victory at Adowa was quite exceptional, the Zulu victory at Isandhlwana short-lived and the prolonged resistance of the Nandi and Samori Toure ended in defeat. African states were mostly organized in small political units based on clans. These states were often at war with their neighbours, as a result of religious or trade rivalries. There was a lack of common ideology to unite separate communities. Even Islam failed to provide a unifying force in West Africa because of rivalries between Islamic states. European imperialists were able to exploit longstanding rivalries between African states and offer “protection” against traditional enemies. There were frequent civil wars caused by succession disputes. Very few states allied against the European invaders, and the alliances came too late to offer effective resistance.

African military weakness was an even more crucial factor. In the 1870s and 1880s African armies were rapidly overtaken by advances in European weaponry. First came the breech-loading repeater rifle to be followed by the Maxim in 1889, which had a devastating effect against African soldiers armed with spears or muzzle-loading muskets. African armies could not acquire sufficient ammunition or spare parts and lacked skilled repairmen or gunsmiths. There were few adequately trained standing armies. These weaknesses were a facilitating factor in European imperial expansion along with others such as the use of steamships, railways and the telegraph and the discovery of quinine to treat malaria. But they do not explain the European decisions to colonize Africa, which relate more to political, economic and strategic factors related to rivalry between European powers after 1870.

France and Britain were established colonial powers and nationalists in the new nation-states of Germany and Italy felt that their own countries could increase their status and influence in international affairs by acquiring colonies in Africa. Italy attempted to establish colonies in north-east Africa, and fear of Italian activity led France to occupy Tunis. Strategic reasons led Britain to occupy Egypt in 1882 and this triggered further rivalry and imperial conquest. Meanwhile European businessmen were exerting pressure on their governments to colonize in order to keep out trading rivals. The rivalry also involved competition for raw materials such as gold, diamonds, rubber and palm oil. Once the seeds of European rivalry had been sown in Africa, only direct control of territory would protect the interests of rival imperial powers.

**7. Compare and contrast the nature and results of resistance to European imperialism by the Nandi and the Ndebele.**

The Nandi put up the strongest and longest resistance to European encroachment of all the peoples of East Africa before 1914. Their terrain was ideal for guerrilla warfare and the climate a hazard for invading forces. They were more mobile than the British and the traditional tactics, involving night fighting and ambushes, of their experienced and disciplined soldiers, worked well against the British. Resistance against the British came at a time when the Nandi had in Koitalel an orkoiyot who acted as a major unifying force and significant aid to resistance. He was a strong nationalist opposed to any accommodation with foreigners.

Nandi resistance began in the early 1890s until 1905. The Ndebele began their resistance in March 1896. They resented their loss of independence to the British South Africa Company. They attacked isolated European farms at a time when many of the Company police were interned in the Transvaal after the defeat of the Jameson Raid. The settlers then retreated into the towns which were besieged by the Ndebele. The rising had a significant religious aspect through the involvement of Mkwati, chief priest of the Mwari Cult.

The British could not defeat the Nandi until the Orkoiyot Koitalel Arap Samoei was murdered by British officers in 1905, at a meeting which had been treacherously arranged. A British relief force sent from the Cape soon defeated the Ndebele, who then realized they had little hope of regaining their independence. At the end of 1896 the Ndebele indunas negotiated peace terms with Rhodes.

Though the Ndebele were more easily defeated than the Nandi, the results of resistance had a less negative impact on them. Many Ndebele were killed, and trade and agriculture were disrupted. But Rhodes recognized the Ndebele indunas as salaried officials and spokesmen for their people in the colonial administration. The Company and the British government became more sensitive to African grievances. The struggle for freedom in the 1890s was an important inspiration for a later generation of African nationalists. Several hundred Nandi died in the fighting that followed the death of Samoei. The south-east Nandi clans were moved to a northern reserve away from the railway to protect it from attacks and to make more land available for European settlement. British forts were built and colonial administration established. The Nandi had lost people, land and freedom and for the rest of the colonial period resorted only to passive resistance.

*If only the Nandi or the Ndebele are discussed, mark out of a maximum of [7 marks].*

**8. For what reasons, and with what results, did Apolo Kagwa collaborate with the British in Buganda up until 1900?**

Apolo Kagwa consistently cooperated with the British from the time he became part of the Protestant bakungu hierarchy of county chiefs who rose to prominence in the late pre-colonial period. The agents of British imperialism arrived in Uganda after the Anglo-German agreement of 1890 recognized Uganda as a British sphere of influence. Lugard as the agent of the Imperial British East Africa Company sought to make this a practical reality by establishing some control over the country. He supported the Protestants, converts of mostly English CMS missionaries, in their struggle for power over the Catholics at the battle of Mengo Hill. Kagwa welcomed the establishment of a Uganda Protectorate in 1894. He resolutely opposed the rebellion by the King of Buganda, Kabaka Mwanga, and became the senior regent as well as Katikiro when the Kabaka was deposed in 1897. He was the leading negotiator with Sir Harry Johnston of the Uganda Agreement of 1900 which defined the basis of British administration. It rewarded him and the senior Christian leaders for their loyalty to the British by a new system of land tenure. Buganda lost its ultimate sovereignty but obtained a significant measure of internal autonomy and recognition of its status as a separate kingdom within Uganda. The Kabakaship remained but the Kabaka's powers were limited by the establishment of a parliament called the Lukiko. The agreement was a blow to the traditional clan chiefs. The Christian chiefs benefited from the mailo freehold system of land tenure. The Lukiko was allowed to spend funds without supervision from the British and no new direct taxes could be imposed on the Baganda without their consent. Buganda was like other provinces of Uganda subject to the laws which the British made for the whole protectorate. The agreement had less direct impact on the rest of Uganda but it marked the beginning of British colonial administration of all Uganda, often using Baganda agents. These agents were not simply self-seeking collaborators but took positive steps to promote education, eradicate sleeping sickness and spread new crops around the country. Buganda's distinctive situation was later to complicate the path to independence in Uganda.

**9. “Resisters were losers; collaborators were gainers.” How accurately does this summarize the results of African responses to European conquest in Southern Africa before 1920?**

Candidates are likely to support the statement by comparing Khama’s collaboration with the British with the resistance to German rule in Namibia of the Herero and the Nama. Khama and two other Tswana rulers chose to ask for British protection in 1885 after their territory had been declared a British sphere of influence at the Berlin West Africa Conference. Britain declared the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1891. Khama sought protection from the Boers and the Ndebele and he knew that the British were anxious to pre-empt a Boer or German move to take over the territory. As a result of his move Ngwato identity and lands were preserved. The British appointed a resident commissioner and technically Khama was a colonial chief under indirect rule. In practice, he was allowed to operate as an independent ruler, partly because British administrators approved his policies of promoting Christianity and education and by developing agriculture and trade. He managed to increase the power of the Ngwato monarchy in the community by using British officials against internal rivals. Khama was able to preside over nearly half a century of peaceful and largely beneficial change.

The Nama and Herero clearly lost from their resistance but some candidates might challenge the statement by pointing out that collaboration did not necessarily bring gains. The Nama and Herero had resisted the initial imposition of German rule from 1889 to 1894, then negotiated treaties with the Germans and cooperated with them against other South-west African tribes until 1904. But the Germans did not honour the terms of the treaties and allowed German settlers to alienate African land. By 1904 the Herero were experiencing the full negative effects of more direct German occupation, as they lost land to settlers and railway companies and cattle to a rinderpest epidemic and to German traders who seized them as repayment of debts. The spontaneous resistance in 1904 to cumulative German colonial oppression had disastrous consequences. The Herero failed to win the support from other African communities. A letter requesting support from the Nama leader was ignored. The Herero were unprepared for the ferocity of the German response and had little experience of guerrilla warfare. The new German commander Von Trotha treated the Herero with a brutality unparalleled in the history of colonial rule in Africa. He decisively defeated them in the Battle of Waterberg but went on to wage a war of extermination. Women and children died of scurvy or the effects of forced labour in prison camps, while thousands of others died of starvation after fleeing into the Kalahari Desert. Less than a quarter of the Herero people survived the genocide. The Nama later rose against the Germans and over half of them died. The resistance was followed by years of forced labour as Nama and Herero freemen, landowners and ranchers were turned into landless labourers for German settlers. They lost all their land.

**10. Why did the leadership of the Mandinka Empire (1880–1898) fail to protect it from French conquest?**

Samori Toure first came into contact with the French in 1882. By then he had spent 20 years building up his Mandinka Empire and was at the height of his power. He had a powerful, professional, well-trained, disciplined and equipped army with soldiers loyally united with him in Islam and Mandinka nationalism.

After his first indecisive war against France (1882–1886), he signed a treaty giving up a small part of his empire to France and agreeing on each power's sphere of influence. Samori made the serious error of attempting to capture Sikasso. The French supplied them with arms and began to encourage revolts in his empire. He failed to persuade any other African rulers, including Ahmadi of the Tokolor Empire, to join him in his struggle against the French. He tried to make an agreement with the British through the Governor of Sierra Leone. But at the Berlin West Africa Conference, his empire had been declared a French sphere of influence, and the British could not disregard French treaties without the same thing happening to their own.

British traders in Sierra Leone were, however, allowed to supply him with six thousand repeater rifles and a vast quantity of ammunition. In 1891, after capturing Segu, the French invaded Samori's empire from three directions. The war was fought ruthlessly on both sides. The French committed numerous atrocities against civilians. Samori waged total war by employing a scorched earth policy, destroying crops and buildings and evacuating people from areas about to be occupied by the enemy. In 1894 the French overran the Mandinka Empire. Samori therefore abandoned it, escaped with a remnant of his army, and conquered and founded an entirely new empire to the east, in the present Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire. An attempt to ally with the Asantehene was forestalled by Britain's occupation of Asante in 1896. Samori was very much on the defensive by 1896. He had difficulty getting firearms, was surrounded by colonial powers, the British in the Gold Coast and the French to the east and south. His new subjects were not his own Dyula and Malinke people. In Gonja, for example, he was just a foreign invader. In 1898, Samori himself was captured by the French. He still had 100 000 followers but their food and flocks had gone. Thousands had died and thousands were dying of starvation. He was deported to Gabon where he died in 1900. His defeat cannot be attributed to his qualities as a leader. He simply had no real answer to the vastly superior weaponry of the French. It might be argued that he could have put his empire under French "protection" but unlike most leaders at the time, he was able to mobilize the masses against the colonial invaders.

**11. In what ways did apartheid, as developed between 1948 and 1960, differ from earlier racial policies in South Africa?**

From the beginning of the Union of South Africa, non-whites were denied political rights and subject to discriminatory laws. The Mines and Works Acts of 1911 and 1926 established an industrial colour bar. The Natives Land Act of 1913 forbade blacks to own land except in native reserves (7% of the country) or to practise share-cropping. The Act turned them into labourers for white farmers. The Native Urban Areas Act regulated the presence of non-whites in towns. Black voting rights at the Cape were abolished. Jobs were reserved for “poor whites”. The main features of South Africa’s racial policy were already present before 1948. For Africans there were virtually no political rights, job restrictions, economic exploitation and residential segregation.

There were, however, fundamental changes made between 1948 and 1960 following the electoral victory of the National Party. The NP government presented apartheid as a new positive ideology of “separate development” and underpinned it with massive new legislation. This showed that the previous racial system had not been worked out in detail. In the next two decades many laws were passed to make segregation more far-reaching and harmful to the black majority. Apartheid was implemented more confidently and ruthlessly than previous racial policies. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act (1949) made it illegal for people of different races to marry. The Population Registration Act (1950) classified all South Africans by race. Coloured families suffered the most, with different members of the same family in some cases being classified differently. The Group Areas Act (1950) gave the government the power to declare areas “whites only” and force blacks out. The Suppression of Communism Act (1950) labelled any critic of apartheid as Communist and therefore a member of a banned organization. The Abolition of Passes Act (1952) actually tightened up earlier pass laws, which were strictly enforced by police raids. The Native Labour Act abolished collective bargaining and freedom of association by Africans. The Separate Amenities Act (1953) designated all public services and public spaces with signs specifying “Europeans only” and “non-Europeans only”, for example post offices, trains and buses, parks and beaches. The Bantu Education Act (1953) required black schools to provide separate courses from white ones, to fit them for life in rural areas and not in white cities. They would be taught in their ethnic language and not in English. The Mines and Works Act (1956) prohibited any Africans from doing skilled work in the mines. Verwoerd in 1959 introduced the Promotion of the Bantu Self-Government Act. This created Bantustans or so-called black homelands. Eight nominally independent units were created, giving 13% of South Africa’s land to 70% of the population. No other country recognized them. Legally all black South Africans in “white” South Africa became temporary residents, without title to civil liberties or property ownership. It would be appropriate to discuss the impact these laws had on black people, but discussion of how they led to an unprecedented degree of black resistance and the violent suppression of that resistance is outside the scope of the question.

**12. How different was Steve Biko's Black Consciousness Movement from the policies of the African National Congress (ANC) up until 1994?**

The ANC had followed policies of passive resistance but then formed a military wing after the Sharpeville massacre, but the Rivonia trial (1963–1964) seriously weakened the ANC. Mandela, Sisulu and six others were sentenced to life imprisonment. Its main leaders were either on Robben Island or in exile. Ever since the ANC was founded in 1912, the question of how far blacks should allow other races into the movement had been an important and difficult one. They chose a multi-racial approach, which was clearly set out in the Freedom Charter of 1955 and in Mandela's speech at his trial.

Steve Biko, in contrast, argued in favour of Black Consciousness. It started as a university student movement when he was a medical student at Natal University. He formed an all-black body in 1969 and became its first president. He explained in newsletters his ideas of Black Consciousness. He argued that as a result of living for generations in a white-dominated society, black people had lost confidence in themselves. They came to assume or to act as if whites were superior so they accepted too easily, if unhappily, the bad way in which they were treated. Until they had confidence in themselves and their society, Biko said, blacks would never gain their freedom, and to regain their confidence, they must end their dependence on the whites. Biko set up Black Community Programmes including a Community Health Clinic. His reputation grew in South Africa and internationally. The ideas of Black Consciousness caught on especially among young blacks. The government banned Biko in 1973, detained him without trial in 1976, rearrested him in 1977, tortured and killed him at the age of 30, closed down his programmes and banned or detained other Black Consciousness leaders. But young black people were now ready to defy the government and police at almost any cost.

The ANC remained banned but continued to resist the apartheid government and fight for a multiracial democratic future for South Africa. For at least a decade after 1964 the ANC virtually ceased to exist and the military wing had negligible success. But the leadership in exile was committed to the armed struggle against apartheid, getting international support and attempting to make the African townships ungovernable. These tactics began to succeed. The ANC revived as a political force in the 1980s and Mandela came back into prominence as the focus of the Free Mandela campaign.

A new president, De Klerk, and leading white politicians and businessmen realized they could not win the armed struggle and would gain more from working with the ANC. It was unbanned and Mandela was released from prison in 1990. Negotiations led to constitutional reform and an election in 1994. The ANC triumphed in South Africa's first non-racial elections in 1994 and its leader, Mandela, became president.

**13. Compare and contrast the impact of British colonial rule on Kenya and Tanganyika.**

Kenya became a British colony when it became the East African Protectorate. Colonial economic development started with the building of the Uganda Railway, which greatly improved communication and facilitated agriculture and trade. Cotton and coffee growing were started and white settler agriculture was encouraged. Land was made very cheaply available on 99 year leases. The occupation of land in the central highlands, however, displaced African settler farmers. They were not allowed to grow cash crops and were forced by the introduction of taxation to offer their labour to white settlers. They were denied political freedom and representation till the last few years of colonial rule. There was development of infrastructure including roads and telecommunications. There was a steady expansion of education, first in the hands of missionaries but later controlled by the government. Health facilities were built around the country. There was a growth of towns and processing industries. Indian immigrants, who came to build the railway but ended up as industrialists and traders, had limited rights. Christianity spread rapidly and reduced polygamy.

Tanganyika was transferred from German to British rule after the First World War. The new administration did not encourage European settlers but sought to encourage African local administration but this was separated from the British controlled central government to discourage African nationalism, which was allowed to develop only in the 1950s. Unlike in Kenya, African cash crop farming was encouraged. The Chagga were very successful in coffee growing and the production of cotton and groundnuts steadily increased. In Tanganyika as in Kenya, there was a steady increase in education and health facilities, improvements in communication with an extension of the railway system. Both countries were affected by the Great Depression but recovered in the 1930s. Both countries had problems after 1945 resettling their returning soldiers. Tanganyika achieved independence earlier and more peacefully than Kenya. It lacked the ethnic divisions of Kenya, the obstacles created by a large settler community and the violence associated with Mau Mau. It had Kiswahili as a unifying national language, an overwhelmingly popular party, TANU, led by the charismatic Nyerere, who worked harmoniously with the last British governor, and trusteeship status.

*If only Kenya or Tanganyika is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [7 marks].*



**14. Assess the advantages and disadvantages of indirect rule in Nigeria up until 1960.**

The basic principle of British colonial administration in Nigeria was indirect rule, first worked out in Northern Nigeria by Lugard (1900–1906). The theory was that the local rule of traditional kings should be maintained. This worked well in the Sokoto Caliphate where the emirates covered large areas and had an efficient and highly developed system of law and administration. The emirs appointed district and village heads, held their own courts, collected taxes, part of which went to the central government. Nigeria was divided into provinces with a British Resident and subdivided into districts. The British officials acted as advisors and supervisors. Indirect rule worked less well when it was later introduced in Southern Nigeria. In the west, the British regarded the Alafin of Oyo as supreme ruler of Yorubaland, but traditionally he had limited authority. In much of eastern Nigeria, there were no traditional rulers but many small village democracies ruled by a council of elders. But the British created new rulers among the Igbo, who proved very unpopular and were often corrupt.

From the British viewpoint, the system was cheap and seemed fairly efficient. To have run local government entirely with white officials would have been very expensive. In Northern Nigeria, the system was rooted in respect for Islam and traditional culture. The British excluded mission schools from much of the north, but did little to provide Western education, to which few northerners had access. This put the north at a great disadvantage both before and after independence, creating an education gap which it was difficult to close. The Western-educated were excluded from the system of indirect rule. The Western-trained lawyers of Lagos were excluded from the law courts in much of Nigeria, where justice was in the hands of chiefs or white officials without a legal education.

Indirect rule created regional rivalry which complicated and delayed Nigeria's achievement of independence. It proved very difficult to find a post-colonial structure that would satisfy the ambitions of rival politicians in the north, south-west and south-east. It can be argued that indirect rule in Nigeria was a poor foundation for future self-government. It excluded the elite who emerged as the leading nationalists and it sought to perpetuate traditional, conservative societies interested in serving their own interests and retaining their power.

*If only advantages or disadvantages are discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].*

**15. In what ways did Christian missions act as instruments of change in colonial Africa? Answer with specific reference to *either* North, West and South Africa *or* East and Central Africa.**

Missionaries played a major role in providing educating for children from a wide range of social backgrounds. The degree of provision depended on a variety of factors including the receptiveness of particular African societies to Christian teaching, the degree of cooperation missionaries had already obtained from traditional rulers, for example, in Botswana and Buganda, the policies of particular colonial governments and the spread of Islam. In West Africa, mission schools made a much greater contribution to the development of education in British colonies than in French colonies. In Buganda missionaries had already established secondary schools for the sons of chiefs by the first decade of the twentieth century, whereas the three British territories in Central Africa did not have a single secondary school for Africans before the Second World War. Mission education provided both the personnel to serve the colonial system and began undermining the system by educating many future leaders of the nationalist struggle for racial equality and political reform.

Christian mission teaching helped the development of nationalism. It was a world religion, not an ethnic one, and could unite different communities, especially in boarding schools. Missionary education thus helped to equip African societies with the means to challenge political colonialism.

Discussion of the cultural impact must go beyond vague generalizations about undermining African culture. The attitude of missionaries caused no conflict in Buganda but there was a major collision with the Kikuyu in the 1920s and 1930s, who established independent schools to restore traditional initiation rights and to provide education for those excluded from mission schools. The missionary provision of health services varied as much as the educational provision but it contributed to the decline in mortality rates, especially infant mortality, and to a period of unprecedented population growth. Modern education also contributed to this process with educated women far less likely to lose their children to diarrhoea, malnutrition, malaria, measles or polio.

**16. With specific reference to *two* countries, analyse the changing role of women in colonial Africa.**

This may not prove to be a popular topic as it is not well-documented and most textbooks have only thin and scattered references to the role of women. There may be many vague generalizations but the question requires specific reference to the changing status of women in the colonial period in two countries. In some ways the status of women changed little in this period. Most women continued to marry soon after they could bear children, and bride wealth was still insisted on by brides and parents. In most parts of Africa polygamy declined.

Many women did not benefit economically from the colonial period. Men usually took most of the income from cash-crop farming, while women did some of the extra work.

Many women profited from expanding food markets, but few gained independent property in land or cattle. Labour migration gave men cash and wider experience while leaving women to grow food and care for children, themselves a growing burden where populations increased. Where the migrant husband was ill-paid, the wife might have to undertake casual wage labour. West African women retained their place in trade, but most new economic opportunities went to men, while women were “tertiarized”, supplying quasi-domestic services or being reduced to prostitution in towns dominated by wifeless young men. Women also found few political roles in the colonial order.

Women could benefit from religious and educational change. There were improvements in female status among emancipated women in Egypt and Tunisia but in northern Nigeria women were completely secluded. Christian schools helped raise marriage ages and gain access to employment.

*If only one country is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].*

**17. Analyse the impact of ethnic *and* religious rivalries on the political history of Uganda up until 1962.**

Politics in Uganda were dominated by ethnic and religious rivalries to an extent unknown in other parts of East Africa. It lacked a national party with an accepted leader and without strong local loyalties. The British had treated the kingdom of Buganda as though it were a separate unit within the Uganda Protectorate. The Lukiiko (Buganda parliament) had exercised independent authority. Because Buganda was governed so differently from the rest of the protectorate, it made the achievement of independence more difficult. The British use of indirect rule had emphasized the continuing role of the Kabaka (King) in the political life of Buganda. Kabaka Mutesa II was determined to retain Buganda's special status in an independent Uganda and was threatening to secede from Uganda. He was deported to Britain between 1953 and 1955. But the colonial government made major concessions to Buganda which, under the independence constitution of 1961, was allowed to exercise internal self-government and to have indirect elections to parliament. The Buganda royalist party, the Kabaka Yekka (KY) ("The King Alone") had no ideology or programme beyond securing a privileged place for the kingdom of Buganda within Uganda.

The first so-called national party, the Uganda National Congress, was in reality an association of Protestant Baganda, nearly all old boys of King's College Budo. It soon disintegrated and was replaced by the Uganda People's Congress (UPC), which came to be led by Milton Obote from the North. It faced strong competition from the more conservative Catholic-dominated Democratic Party (DP). In order to win power, the UPC entered into a marriage of convenience with the Kabaka Yekka. Both were largely Protestant but had little else in common. Uganda became independent in 1962 with an uneasy coalition of the UPC and KY. Obote became prime minister and the Kabaka a ceremonial president. The rich farmers in Buganda were attracted to the KY, Protestant leaders and traders in the rest of the country to the UPC, while Catholic civil servants, other educated elite and trade unionists rallied to the DP.

*If only ethnic or religious rivalries are discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].*

**18. Why did Zambia achieve independence earlier and more peacefully than Mozambique?**

Zambia achieved independence in 1964, eleven years before Mozambique and without an armed struggle. As Northern Rhodesia, it had been part of the Central African Federation since 1953, which was pushed through by the British government and white settlers in Southern Rhodesia as a deliberate attempt to pre-empt the emergence of an African independence movement. African nationalist leaders protested against the federation but there was a brief lull in African political activity until new racist legislation led to a series of strikes, boycotts and demonstrations in Northern Rhodesia. Kaunda led a campaign of non-violent protest. He was imprisoned (1959–1960) and on his release became president of the newly formed United National Independence Party (UNIP). By then the British government of Harold Macmillan recognized the winds of change sweeping across Africa and was ready to decolonize. The Monckton Report brought British acceptance of the right to secede from the federation, which Northern Rhodesia did in 1963. Kaunda became the first president of independent Zambia in 1964.

Mozambique became independent eleven years later and only after an armed struggle because Portugal, the poorest of the colonial powers, believed that her colonies were indispensable to her economy. Dr Salazar was a dictator ready to ignore the pressure of public opinion and his government insisted that Mozambique was an overseas territory and an integral part of Portugal. The large-scale white settlement which Portugal had encouraged to alleviate her own unemployment problem was an obstacle to majority rule. Mozambique was regarded by South Africa and some Western countries who had invested in South Africa as essential to the defence of the “white south”. These countries offered military aid to Portugal in her struggle with Frelimo. Independence came only when the Portuguese army lost the will to resist and to suffer further losses and overthrew the Portuguese dictatorship in a coup in 1974. The new government in Portugal negotiated with Frelimo and Samora Machel became the first president of Mozambique in 1975.

*If only Zambia or Mozambique is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].*

**19. Analyse the relative roles of MPLA and UNITA in the liberation war in Angola up until 1975.**

The Portuguese saw the future development of her colonies lying in closer union with the metropolitan power and certainly not in independence. In 1951 Angola became an “overseas province” of Portugal. It was impossible, however, that Angola would remain immune from the unrest and growing sense of nationalism which was sweeping over Africa by the 1960s. The first serious uprising was in the capital Luanda in February 1961; the Portuguese took bloody reprisals. This began the liberation war, but resistance forces in Angola remained divided. The first to emerge, the Movement for the Popular Liberation of Angola (MPLA) attracted support from civil servants in Luanda. It was led by the Marxist intellectual, Agostinho Neto. The Union for the National Independence of the Totality of Angola (UNITA) attracted support from the central and southern Ovimbundu people. It attracted some support from Zambia and made secret overtures to the Portuguese, offering to help them destroy the left-wing MPLA in return for favoured treatment in a compromise settlement of the colonial struggle. The deal sowed the seeds for many more years of conflict in the highlands of Angola.

The liberation war had two intense phases, separated by a long period of stalemate, in which the colony remained on a war footing but few casualties occurred. The first was led in 1961 by the MPLA. Inspired by the sudden decolonization of Belgian Congo and stirred by peasant starvation, the MPLA tried to liberate its imprisoned leaders in an attack on Luanda gaol. Portugal recovered control with a large metropolitan army and a new economic policy, including the exploitation of oil resources, brought moderate economic well-being, even among Africans, and helped postpone the second phase of active fighting until 1975. By then MPLA and UNITA had failed in their bid for freedom and the conflict was not about liberation itself but who would inherit the spoils in a colony that had become rich and successful. There was fratricidal conflict both between and within MPLA and UNITA and they achieved no nationalist victory. Over 40% of the armed forces fighting against them were themselves Angolan Africans. Though unable to complete their own liberation, MPLA and UNITA helped produce conditions for the liberation of Portugal itself. The maintenance of a conscript army, more than 60 000 in Angola, placed increasing strains on Portuguese society and its economy. The Portuguese army lost the will to resist and suffer further losses and overthrew the Portuguese dictatorship in a coup in 1974. The colonies were the immediate beneficiaries. The new military regime on 11 November 1975 bequeathed independence “to the people of Angola as a whole”. The MPLA assumed power in Luanda that day but UNITA still controlled a substantial power-base in central and southern Angola. The stage was thus set for many years of civil war, but discussion of it is outside the scope of the question.

*If only MPLA or UNITA is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].*

**20. Why did Senegal achieve independence later than Guinea?**

In the 1950s Senegalese politics were dominated by Leopold Senghor while the trade unionist and party leader Sekou Toure was extending his support in the Guinean countryside. Senegal, where the French had applied a limited assimilation policy to four communes, might have been expected to achieve independence earlier than Guinea. Guinea, however, became independent in 1958 thanks to the courageous and defiant stand of Sekou Toure with the full support of the workers and the students. De Gaulle came to power in France in 1958 and prepared a new constitution for the Fifth Republic. He asked all the colonies to vote in a referendum on whether they wanted to retain their connection with France. They could join a French Community within which France would retain control of their foreign and defence policies. All except Guinea voted yes. In Guinea the “no” vote was over 80% and Guinea proclaimed its independence in October 1958. French aid to Guinea was promptly withdrawn. De Gaulle’s revenge stripped it of everything, down to its French-supplied telephones.

Guinea’s independence inspired a revolution in attitudes in French West Africa. Countries which had been nervous about the prospect of independence without adequate French support now demanded it. The French acquiesced with startling speed and eight West African countries, among them Senegal, all became independent within a few months of each other in 1960. France was facing an escalating colonial war in Algeria and felt that early reform in sub-Saharan Africa would forestall another crisis. Sekou Toure was exceptional among French West African leaders in demanding independence as forcefully and successfully as Nkrumah had in Ghana. Senghor’s reluctance to campaign so vigorously for independence was partly due to his desire to retain the former large federations of French West and Equatorial Africa and avoid what he called the “balkanization” of Africa.

*If only Senegal or Guinea is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].*

**21. For what reasons, and with what results, did civil war break out in any *two* African countries since independence and up until 2000?**

No generalization can explain either the causes or results of civil wars. The Congo has had two civil wars, one soon after independence, the other more recently and with quite different causes and results. Each civil war is related to the history of the particular country, and the specific causes of conflict should be explored in depth, whether the examples chosen are from Angola, Burundi, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Liberia, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan or Uganda. However, a common factor in most civil wars was the perception that only violent protest could accomplish change, the circumstances which led to the attempted secession of Biafra and the civil war in Nigeria were quite different from those which led Museveni and a small handful of men to attack Kabamba barracks and begin a war of insurgency in Uganda. Ethnic factors were predominant in Burundi and especially Rwanda, where they led to genocidal conflict between Hutus and Tutsis in 1994. Power hungry leaders like Taylor in Liberia or Savimbi in Angola exploited ethnic divisions. In Somalia, those fighting were all Somali and shared a common language and religion but were influenced by clan rivalry.

Apart from the obvious point that civil wars cause death and injury, disruption of civil life, damage to infrastructure and displacement of peoples, no generalization could cover the consequences which have been as different as the causes. Insurgencies in Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia led to the overthrow of established governments but attempts at secession in Nigeria and the Congo were crushed, in the latter case by UN troops. Some of the civil wars attracted foreign interventions and United Nations involvement which varied in effectiveness. Some civil wars, notably Angola, became a focus for active Cold War confrontation between the superpowers. Some wars were ended by regional mediation.

*If only one country is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].*



22. **“Military regimes have been more successful than the civilian regimes they replaced.” With reference to any *two* countries in Africa since independence, to what extent do you agree with this statement?**

Candidates may challenge or support the statement according to the examples chosen. For all the weaknesses of the Haile Selassie government, it is very questionable whether the military government which replaced it was more successful. The word “successful” can be discussed. Successful in what and for whom? It would be difficult to argue that the bloodstained regime of Idi Amin in Uganda from 1971 to 1979 was more successful than the Obote regime it replaced, despite the many weaknesses of the latter. Amin’s attack on Tanzania led to an invasion of Uganda from Tanzania and the overthrow of Amin. Military coups were prompted by a complex of reasons, which included specifically military grievances, fear of victimization, ethnic rivalry and personal ambition. It could be argued that Mobutu brought stability to the Congo but he also established a dictatorial kleptocracy.

Candidates might take a more favourable view of military intervention in Ghana or Nigeria. Corruption, lavish spending, dictatorial intolerance of criticism and neglect of the country’s worsening economic situation led to the overthrow of Nkrumah in 1966. There had been a growing feeling among Ghanaians that Nkrumah was playing the international statesman at the expense of his country’s mounting economic problems. The military regime was successful in reducing corruption, ridding the civil service of Nkrumah’s supporters and handing power back to the veteran civilian politician Kofi Busia. The rule of Lieutenant Rawlings could be discussed even though he later became a civilian president. It would be appropriate to argue that the rule of Colonel Nasser in Egypt was more successful than the corrupt regime of King Farouk in both domestic and foreign policy. Candidates may have mixed reactions to the record of Colonel Gaddafi in Libya, who overthrew King Idris.

In Nigeria, friction between the three major ethnic groups was one of the main causes of the fall of the First Republic in 1966. The widespread belief that the elections of 1964–1965 had been rigged finally destroyed the credibility of the civilian government. The coup leaders said they had come to eradicate the “VIPs” of waste. The coup unfortunately raised suspicions that the Igbos were plotting to seize power and General Gowon led a counter-coup in July 1966. Further violence against Igbos led Colonel Ojukwu to proclaim an independent Biafra. The civil war ended with the defeat of the Igbos in 1970. Gowon then achieved a remarkable level of reconciliation. But his government became increasingly inefficient. A frequent weakness of military regimes was to spend more on the army than the economy could stand or the situation of the country justified. Military rulers in Ghana and Nigeria were willing to return their countries to civilian rule, but still expected civilian governments to maintain the same defence budgets.

*If only one country is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].*

**23. Compare and contrast the reasons for, and results of, United Nations interventions in Congo and Somalia.**

In June 1960, the Congo became independent and Belgium withdrew, leaving it less prepared for independence than any other former colony. There was no more than a handful of university graduates and not one Congolese doctor, lawyer or trained military officer. The army mutinied within days of independence and Europeans were attacked. The prime minister appealed to the UN for help. The situation worsened when the copper rich province of Katanga broke away from the Congo and declared itself an independent state. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld was able to present a solution to the Security Council, creating a special force, ONUC, the largest and most complex civilian and military operation ever mounted by the UN.

Somalia was drawn in the 1970s and 1980s into Cold War conflict because of its strategic location in the Horn of Africa and its extensive Indian Ocean coastline. Soviet backing for the Ethiopian revolutionary regime brought American support for the Somali regime of Siyad Barre. Superpower interest in the region faded with the end of the Cold War, and without the support of his powerful patron, Barre's authoritarian, corrupt and deeply unpopular regime collapsed in early 1991. The normally rival opposition groups who overthrew him then fought for the spoils. The result was civil war and humanitarian disaster. The UN only reluctantly became involved in 1992 when it became clear that a million and a half people were at risk of starvation. UNOSOM was set up to deliver humanitarian aid.

In an atmosphere of bitter criticism, ONUC maintained the integrity of the Congo, helped to restore law and order, used diplomacy and force to end the civil war and secession of Katanga, brought about the removal of disruptive elements including European mercenaries and helped to reconstruct the ruined states. Had it not been for the UN operation, the Congo would most probably have disintegrated into a multiplicity of states each backed by the US or USSR, which would have led to many Angolan-type civil wars.

The UN achieved no such success in Somalia. It proved incapable of protecting aid supplies and ensuring their delivery. A task force under American operational control, UNITAF, fared no better. At the root of the UN's failure was the absence of a "host state". Somalia was, and remained over a decade after the departure of UNOSOM/UNITAF in 1995, a failed state. Over 100 peacekeepers lost their lives. The protection and distribution of emergency aid required an enforcement role but the UN avoided the essential but clearly very dangerous task of disarming militias. It relied instead on the vain hope that a show of force, both military and diplomatic, would be sufficient to subdue opposition.

*If only Congo or Somalia is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [7 marks].*

24. **“Closer union in Africa, whether political or economic, continental or regional, has enjoyed only limited success.” With reference to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and to one regional organization, to what extent do you agree with this statement?**

Since the statement refers to “limited” success, it should be possible to agree with the statement. Candidates should identify successes and failures in the work of the OAU and of a regional organization. The OAU was formed to promote economic and political cooperation among member states. It generally found it difficult to achieve these objectives. One major weakness was that it had no legal sanctions to enforce its resolutions. It could not prevent conflicts breaking out within and between member states. But it played a part in the resolution of some disputes, *e.g.* between Morocco and Algeria, and encouraged regional peacekeeping, *e.g.* by ECOMOG.

Africa’s general poverty prevented any significant progress in social and economic cooperation. The African Development Bank, which grew out of the OAU, helped mobilize finance for African development projects. But African development and economic unity was hampered by corruption and poor leadership, the burden of debt and lack of intra-African trade and foreign investment. The limited success could be ascribed to external factors. During the Cold War, rival power blocs carried their rivalry into Africa in a number of areas, notably Angola. The OAU’s greatest success was its contribution to freeing the continent of colonial rule.

The success of regional organizations varied. The syllabus makes specific reference to three of these organizations, the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the South African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). The early success of the EAC after 1967 was short-lived. Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania worked together for a few years but attempts at greater economic integration were hampered by Tanzania’s fear of economic domination by Kenya and ideological differences especially after the Arusha Declaration. After President Obote of Uganda was overthrown by Amin in 1971, the community’s highest body, the East African Authority, consisting of the three presidents, did not meet again as Nyerere refused to sit with Amin. External trade, fiscal and monetary policy, transport and communication infrastructures which had all been regional were dismantled after 1977 and the East African Community, which had been a model for African regional cooperation, collapsed. The SADCC, founded in 1980, brought together the independent states of South Africa and began coordinating long-term development planning and presenting a united front when negotiating for foreign aid and development loans but had very limited success in reducing the economic dependence of member states on external forces. ECOWAS, founded in Lagos in 1975, was significant as a regional organization in that its membership of 16 states cut across the artificial barriers of Anglophone and Francophone West Africa. It did not try to embark upon political union but concentrated on gradually increasing regional economic cooperation, starting with transport and telecommunications and moving on to greater financial and commercial interchange. In 1990 ECOWAS took the bold political initiative of assembling a peacekeeping force, ECOMOG, in war torn Liberia. Though it had mixed results there and later in Sierra Leone and Cote d’Ivoire, as any international organization may have in a situation of civil war, it showed what could be done by African leaders taking collective responsibility for affairs beyond their own immediate national borders.

*If only the OAU or a regional organization is discussed, mark out of a maximum of [12 marks].*